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ABORTION, PERSUASION, AND EMOTION: 
IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON 
EMOTION FOR READING CASEY 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal* 
Abstract: Although abortion jurisprudence under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey condones State efforts to persuade a woman to forego an abortion in 
favor of childbirth, the opinion’s “truthful and not misleading” language can be read more 
broadly than it traditionally has. Specifically, even a truthful message may mislead when it 
inappropriately takes advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s decision away 
from the decision that would be made in a non-emotional, fully informed state. Drawing on 
empirical research in the social sciences, I suggest that the sort of emotional information that 
many states now provide in their “informed consent” statutes can lead to such inappropriate 
emotional influence and thus should be examined more closely than heretofore. This broader 
reading, taking into account empirical research that gives a better idea of individual decision-
making, suggests that states’ informed consent statutes have the potential to be an 
impermissible burden on the exercise of a woman’s autonomous decision-making about an 
abortion precisely because they bias a woman’s free choice, not inform it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed a 
Massachusetts statute that required a woman seeking an abortion to sign 
a standardized informed consent form that included, among other 
specified elements, “a description of the stage of development of the 
fetus.”1 Relying in part on uncontradicted expert testimony heard in by 
the court below, the Court held that such information, even though 
factually accurate,2 could cause many women emotional distress, 
anxiety, and  guilt, and was, moreover, not “directly material to any 
medically relevant fact.”3 As such, the First Circuit held that this 
information’s potential to cause emotional distress and consequently to 
burden a woman’s decision-making constituted an impermissible 
obstacle to her efforts to seek an abortion; therefore, the court ruled the 
requirement unconstitutional.4 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,5 such a holding was 
not atypical. Previous federal courts had so ruled when evaluating 
statutes requiring that more graphic or detailed information be 
presented.6 And the Supreme Court had twice held similarly, in City of 
                                                     
1. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1008 (1st Cir. 1981). 
2. Id. at 1021–22 & n.29 (stating that plaintiffs/appellants did not contend that the information 
was “factually inaccurate in any material respect”). 
3. Id. at 1021. 
4. See id. at 1022–23. More precisely, the Court ruled that a preliminary injunction against the 
requirement was appropriate because plaintiffs had made the requisite showing that the statute 
would likely be ruled unconstitutional. Id. 
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
6. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 866–
68 (8th Cir. 1981) (striking down the requirement that women be told of “[t]he probable anatomical 
and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed” and 
“[t]he immediate and long-term physical dangers of abortion and psychological trauma resulting 
from abortion and any increased incidence of premature births, tubal pregnancies and stillbirths 
following abortion”); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980) (striking down the 
requirement that a woman be informed of any reasonable medical possibility of the fetus 
experiencing “organic pain”); Women’s Med. Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 
1136, 1153−54 (D.R.I. 1982) (striking down the requirement that a woman be told of the fetus’s 
characteristics at the various gestational ages at which an abortion might be performed); Leigh v. 
Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (D.N.D. 1980) (striking down the requirement that a woman be told 
of the “probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at the time the 
abortion is to be performed”). 
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Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health7 and Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,8 characterizing 
such information as involving a “parade of horribles” and, citing the 
First Circuit’s opinion approvingly, as “inflammatory.”9 
Casey, however, changed this approach. In Casey, the State of 
Pennsylvania had mandated that a doctor provide, at least twenty-four 
hours before performing an abortion, particular information regarding 
“the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of 
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’”10 
Further, the Pennsylvania statute required that the doctor make 
additional printed material available that, in part, described the fetus.11 
No abortion could be performed unless a woman acknowledged in 
writing that she had been informed that these materials were available.12 
The goal of this information was, ostensibly, to further the State’s 
interest in obtaining a woman’s fully informed consent,13 and the Court 
approved Pennsylvania’s approach. In this way, Casey condoned a 
state’s requirement of the “informed consent” of a woman seeking an 
abortion.14 
Of course, Casey made evident Pennsylvania’s effort in this context 
to use such information to encourage women not to pursue the decision 
to abort,15 a politicized effort that Akron and Thornburgh had rejected.16 
                                                     
7. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
8. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
9. Akron, 462 U.S. at 445 (characterizing as “parade of horribles”); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 
n.10 (noting “inflammatory impact” of fetal-description requirements); cf. id. at 762 (stating that 
fetal description “may serve only to confuse and punish [a woman] and to heighten her anxiety”); 
id. at 764 (stating that compelled information regarding “detrimental physical and psychological 
effects” was “the antithesis of informed consent”). These decisions have also been characterized as 
focusing on the imposition on the physician and his flexibility in providing information to the 
woman seeking abortion, rather than on the woman’s decision-making process itself. See, e.g., 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 968−69 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing Akron in 
this way); Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (discussing treatment of physician-patient relationship in 
Thornburgh). 
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 887 (holding that Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirement did not constitute an 
“undue burden” on the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy); cf. Planned Parenthood of Central 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (finding that the State may require prior written informed 
consent before a woman undergoes abortion). 
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
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Casey overruled those cases’ holdings that the State could not provide 
“specific information ‘designed to influence the woman’s informed 
choice between abortion or childbirth.’”17 Thus, Casey condoned a 
state’s use of the informed consent requirement as a vehicle for 
“express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion.”18 This approval 
both echoed precedent19 and presaged further development along the 
same lines eight years later.20 
What animated the Court’s focus on informed consent was, in part, its 
expressed concern over the woman’s psychological health: 
[Previous decisions] recognize a substantial government interest 
justifying a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health 
risks of abortion and childbirth. It cannot be questioned that 
psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can it be 
doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem 
the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the 
decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the 
full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the 
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect 
an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating 
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully 
informed. If the information the State requires to be made 
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the 
requirement may be permissible.21 
Thus, focusing on the State’s previously acknowledged authority to 
further a consciously partisan viewpoint, the Court held that where 
statutorily mandated information is factually accurate and is “truthful 
and not misleading,” a requirement that a woman be exposed to the 
information when seeking her abortion could be allowed.22 
                                                     
16. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443–44 & n.33 (1983); 
Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).  
17. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 444). This overruling of prior case law 
occurred despite the obvious similarities between the regulations struck down in the former cases 
and the one at issue in Casey. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 
1328 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that the legislation at issue in Casey was “similar, if not identical” to 
the provisions struck down in Thornburgh). 
18. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
19. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (holding that the State may express 
preference by funding childbirth, rather than abortion). 
20. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). 
22. Id. at 882–83. 
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Consequently, Casey is typically read as narrowly upholding a 
woman’s right to an abortion, but also as giving more flexibility to the 
State in its effort to persuade her not to exercise that right.23 But, recent 
research in the social sciences involving how individuals experience 
emotion, as well as the influence of emotion on individuals’ thinking, 
can suggest a more expansive reading of the case. Such a reading can 
suggest that despite Casey’s express reversal of Thornburgh and Akron, 
Casey nevertheless can be read as still maintaining those cases’ rejection 
of certain required information, even when that information is factually 
accurate and is “truthful and not misleading.” That is, even the sort of 
information approved of in Casey may nevertheless constitute an 
impermissible, undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion when it 
inappropriately takes advantage of potential emotional influences on her 
decision-making.24 Under this reading, despite Casey’s effort to allow a 
State to further its political message of favoring childbirth over abortion 
by requiring a woman’s informed consent, the message and its medium 
could be evaluated more closely than commonly believed. This closer 
reading might (but by no means must) lead to a finding that a particular 
statute or requirement so interferes with a woman’s decision-making that 
it is inappropriately burdensome. 
This focus is consistent with Casey’s emphasis on truthful 
communications—and echoes a long line of commentators pointing out 
that the moral wrong in lying is the interference with, or limiting of, a 
person’s autonomy and opportunity to choose.25 It is also consistent with 
more recent scholarship suggesting not only that even truthful messages 
can easily be misleading, but also that when they are, they should, 
perhaps, be punished more severely than outright deception.26 And, it is 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking 
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 790 (1996) (stating that Casey’s “central concern was to 
enhance the state’s power to structure the decisionmaking process by which the woman exercises 
her lawful authority to terminate her pregnancy”). 
24. PETER W. ENGLISH & BRUCE D. SALES, MORE THAN THE LAW: BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL 
FACTS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING 53 (2005) (stating that “depending on what information is 
presented and how it is presented, even truthful information can be misleading”); see also Kathy 
Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common-Law Protection for Reproductive 
Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 541−42 (“While the statutes purport to protect the woman’s 
right to make an informed choice, the general thrust of the information they require would dissuade 
a woman from going through with an abortion.”). This manipulation may be deliberate or not, 
which is one factor to be considered in evaluating it. 
25. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18−22 (1978). 
26. See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Paltering, 4 (Harv. John F. Kennedy Sch. of 
Gov’t Faculty Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP07-006, 2007), available at 
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consistent with scholarly efforts to refine the substance of the informed 
consent doctrine, such as those efforts that call for a focus not on the 
injury caused by the provision of (or the failure to provide) certain 
information, but rather on “the decision rights of the plaintiff which the 
defendant destroyed” in providing (or failing to provide) particular 
information.27 This approach also has the benefit of not requiring a 
reworking of abortion doctrine generally; rather, it reflects a more 
thoroughly informed interpretation of existing case law, one that 
considers existing empirical data from the social sciences—some of 
which did not exist when Casey was decided. 
In sketching this broader reading of Casey, I proceed in three parts. 
Section I reviews the content of the informed consent statutes developed 
in the wake of Roe v. Wade28 and identifies the constitutional standard 
by which courts are to evaluate those statutes. Section II documents the 
substantial empirical research in psychology that demonstrates the 
impact of an emotional message on how easily a listener is persuaded by 
that message. There, I describe research on “fear appeals,” identifying 
those features of an emotionally laden message that are most likely to 
effectively bias a listener toward being persuaded. Section II closes by 
demonstrating that the informed consent statutes largely reflect those 
features. Section III addresses potential objections to the broader reading 
of Casey, and the Conclusion emphasizes the importance of developing 
and applying further empirical research to the questions raised in this 
article. 
I.  CASEY’S APPROVAL OF “TRUTHFUL AND NOT 
MISLEADING” SPEECH 
After Roe v. Wade, Pennsylvania was just one of many states to enact 
abortion legislation containing informed consent requirements, 
requirements subsequently upheld in Casey.29 As of February 2008, 
                                                     
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP07-006. 
27. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The 
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609 (emphasis added). Of course, such 
analysis arises in the context of a suit against a particular physician or other health care provider, 
rather than in a constitutional challenge. 
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
29. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882−83 (1992) (holding that informed 
consent provisions requiring the giving of “truthful, nonmisleading information” about the nature of 
the procedure, attendant health risks, fetal development, and the existence of alternatives to 
abortion, did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion). 
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thirty-three states had informed consent abortion laws in effect.30 The 
laws of twenty-nine of these states can reasonably be interpreted as 
requiring the provision of information aimed at discouraging women 
from obtaining abortions.31 
Most states with informed consent abortion laws require the provision 
of information related to, among other things, the nature and associated 
medical risks of the procedure, the medical risks of carrying the 
pregnancy to term, the availability of medical assistance benefits, and 
the support obligations of the father. Many states also require that 
women be informed of the probable gestational age of the fetus,32 as well 
as of the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the fetus.33 In 
                                                     
30. See Mandatory Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF 
(Guttmacher Inst.), Feb. 1, 2008, at 1, http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf.  
31. Id. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-4, 26-23A-5 (2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.05.032, 18.16.060 
(2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-903, 20-16-904 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794 (2006); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, 31-9A-4 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-34-2-1.1 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709, 65-6710 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 311.725 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.17015 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, 145.4243 (West 2007); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-33, 41-41-35 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039 (West 2004); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 50-20-104, 50-20-106, 50-20-304 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-327, 28-327.01 (2003); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-02, 14-02.1-03 (2004); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, 1-738.1-1-
738.3 (West 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3208 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
4.7-3 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-330, 44-41-340 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-
10.1, 34-23A-10.3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. §§ 171.012, 171.014 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5 (2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2I-2, 16-2I-3 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3) (West 2006). The California, Connecticut, and Maine laws require that only 
information related to the risks associated with the medical procedure be made available; these 
requirements are not unique to abortion procedures in those states but apply to other “risky” 
procedures as well. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.02 (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 19a-116 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599-A (2004). 
32. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-903, 20-16-904; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, 31-9A-4; IND. 
CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709, 65-6710; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
311.725; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, 145.4243; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-33, 41-41-35; MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 50-20-104, 50-20-106, 50-20-304; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-327, 28-327.01; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
14-02.1-02, 14-02.1-03; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, 1-
738.3; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3208; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 
44-41-330, 44-41-340; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1, 34-23A-10.3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-15-202; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012, 171.014; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-
305, 76-7-305.5; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2I-2, 16-2I-3; WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3). 
33. ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-4, 26-23A-5; ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.16.032, 18.05.060; GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, 31-9A-4; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709, 65-6710; 
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addition, some states require that women be provided with illustrations 
or color photographs depicting a fetus at various stages during the 
pregnancy.34 Utah is unique in that it requires that women be provided 
with a video in addition to printed materials.35 Moreover, the Utah law 
specifically requires that the video include brain and heart function and 
the presence of external members and internal organs, and present 
adoption as the preferred choice to abortion.36 Utah law further requires 
physicians to encourage women to view the video at the clinic as 
opposed to viewing it elsewhere.37 
Some informed consent abortion laws require a practitioner to give 
information related to the potential medical and psychological effects 
that, according to the state, an elective abortion might elicit. For 
example, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas require that women be 
informed of the risk of developing breast cancer, of the danger to 
subsequent pregnancies, and of the risks of infertility,38 and Wisconsin 
requires that women be informed of risks of endometritis, perforated 
uterus, incomplete abortion, failed abortion, danger to subsequent 
pregnancies, and infertility.39 A number of states require that women be 
informed of potential adverse emotional or psychological trauma that 
may occur as a result of having an abortion.40 Prior to being enjoined by 
a court order,41 South Dakota’s informed consent law required that 
                                                     
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
7-305, 76-7-305.5; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3). These state laws require that this information be 
given to women; many other states’ laws only require that such information be made available 
(usually in the form of printed materials). 
34. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725(2)(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(3)(d); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02.1(1)(b). 
35. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5. 
36. Id. § 76-7-305.5(1)(b).  
37. Id.§ 76-7-305(4). 
38. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, 145.4243; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-33; TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.011, 171.012. Although some authors have described the evidence as 
inconsistent or mixed, medical studies suggest little such relationship between abortions and 
subsequent medical problems. E.g., Karin B. Michels et al., Induced and Spontaneous Abortion and 
Incidence of Breast Cancer Among Young Women: A Prospective Cohort Study, 167 ARCH. INTERN. 
MED. 814 (2007); Mads Melbye et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 N.E. J. 
MED. 81 (1997); Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical 
Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 7−8 
(2006) (reviewing studies). 
39. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3) (West 2006). 
40. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.253(1)(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(1)(a)(f). 
41. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (D.S.D. 2005). 
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women be informed of increased risk of depression, psychological 
distress, suicidal ideation, and suicide.42 
The professed goal of these statutes was to protect a woman’s 
autonomous decision-making, and this was a substantial factor 
motivating the Casey Court.43 The Court was concerned with the state’s 
efforts to expose women seeking abortions to speech that was patently 
false, imposing on their autonomous decision-making process by 
providing information that might mislead them about their decision.44 To 
the Court, such an imposition was clearly inappropriate.45 But, the 
Court’s focus quickly shifted from whether a particular statement was 
true or false—recall that the courts in Casey and Bellotti had 
acknowledged that the prescribed statements were accurate and 
truthful46—to whether a statement unduly affected or influenced a 
woman’s autonomous decision-making.47 
Ostensibly, the way to avoid such influence was for a state to provide 
information about all of the factors, positive and negative, that might 
enter into a woman’s abortion decision, thus assuring that consent is as 
“informed” as possible and that the decision is truly autonomous.48 This 
concern might motivate the State to emphasize potential negative 
                                                     
42. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1, 34-23A-10.3. This law also required that women be 
told that a fetus is a whole, separate, unique, living being and that the woman’s relationship to the 
fetus enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and the laws of South Dakota. 
43. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
44. Id. at 968. 
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1022 n.29 (1st Cir. 
1981) (plaintiffs/appellants did not dispute factual accuracy of information);  cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 
968 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[P]etitioners do 
not claim that the information required to be disclosed by statute is in any way false or inaccurate; 
indeed, the Court of Appeals found it to be ‘relevant, accurate, and non-inflammatory.’”). The Chief 
Justice’s language, deliberate or not, is telling: information may in fact be accurate but also be quite 
inflammatory. 
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (noting that “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it”). 
48. Of course, simply providing information, especially too much information, is likely to be 
unhelpful: people are “boundedly rational” and thus have difficulty processing and considering 
excessive information. As commentators are suggesting, it is better to determine the appropriate 
amount and kind of information to be provided. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Law, Information, and Choice: 
Capitalizing on Heuristic Habits of Thought, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 425 (Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Christoph Engel eds., 2006); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1 (2007). Although behavioral law and economics research shows that people will not use “all 
relevant information”—even if it could be provided—my point here concerns the provision of 
specific, potentially biasing information. 
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physical, psychological, and social consequences of pursuing the 
decision to abort. In particular, the State might argue, “When and if 
some women who have aborted subsequently learn more, especially 
about the fetus, the abortion can come to have traumatic consequences. 
She [sic] must be warned of that possibility now.”49 
Indeed, despite clear scientific findings that such negative 
consequences are not as common as abortion opponents once claimed,50 
neither is it entirely outside the scientific “mainstream” to suggest that 
certain women are more at risk of such negative abortion sequelae.51 
Women generally experience positive emotions after abortion; indeed, 
positive emotions are clearly more prevalent than negative emotions.52 
Nevertheless, some women are more at risk than others to negative 
psychological sequelae: those who pursue abortion for reasons of birth 
defects in the fetus;53 younger women; unmarried women without 
children;54 women who lack social support;55 and women who had 
previously suffered some sort of emotional disturbance or psychological 
                                                     
49. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 814 (providing the argument of a hypothetical state attorney 
general as to justifications for mandating such information) (internal citations omitted); see supra 
note 21 and accompanying text. 
50. Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1194, 1198−99 
(1992). 
51. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 818 (“The mainstream psychological literature reveals that a 
limited number of women may experience certain psychological difficulties, some serious, with 
abortion.”). For a good recent review of the literature related to post-abortion psychological health, 
including directions for future research, see Priscilla K. Coleman et al., The Psychology of Abortion: 
A Review and Suggestions for Future Research, 20 PSYCHOL. & HEALTH 237 (2005). 
52. Adler et al., supra note 50, at 1198. 
53. Bruce D. Blumberg et al., Psychological Sequelae of Abortion Performed for a Genetic 
Indication, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 799 (1975); Cornelia M. Friedman et al., The 
Decision-Making Process and the Outcome of the Therapeutic Abortion, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1332, 1335–36 (1974). 
54. Adler et al., supra note 50, at 1200; David M. Fergusson, Abortion in Young Women and 
Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16 (2006) (showing increased 
levels of post-abortion mental health problems in women under twenty-five years old). But cf. Linda 
M. Pope et al., Postabortion Psychological Adjustment: Are Minors at Increased Risk?, 29 J. 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 2 (2001) (finding that fourteen- to eighteen-year olds are no more likely than 
eighteen- to twenty-one year olds to exhibit post-abortion psychological dysfunction). 
55. See Adler et al., supra note 50, at 1201; Jeanette Martucci, Meta-Analysis: Psychosocial 
Predictors of Psychological Sequelae of Induced Abortion 57 (Apr. 1998) (lack of perceived social 
support associated with poorer psychosocial adjustment) (unpublished dissertation, Miami Institute 
of Psychology of the Caribbean Center for the Advanced Studies) (on file with author). But see 
Adler et al., supra note 50 at 1201 (also reviewing studies, however, showing that link between 
social support and post-abortion emotions may be less clear than thought). 
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dysfunction.56 In some instances, these populations are in fact the ones 
more likely to pursue abortions.57 Thus, although it is clear that most 
women experience positive emotional responses after abortion,58 it is not 
unreasonable for a State to seek to provide information about the 
alternatives, regardless of its political motivations for doing so.59 
In sum, Casey allows the State to mandate the provision of certain 
information about the abortion decision, including explicitly negative 
information about physical, psychological, and social consequences of 
the decision to abort. According to the Court, this is to facilitate a 
woman’s autonomous decision-making by ensuring her fully informed 
consent, to inform women about potential negative sequelae, and to help 
further the State’s constitutional interest in encouraging childbirth over 
abortion.60 
But again, at bottom, the State’s provision of information must 
inform, and not unreasonably hinder, a woman’s decision-making in 
order for it to avoid presenting an unconstitutional undue burden.61 
                                                     
56. Nancy Felipe Russo, Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Its Resolution, in 
ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 593, 615 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 
1992) (noting that “history of emotional disturbance” is a “risk facto[r] for negative emotional 
responses after abortion”). 
57. E.g., Adler et al., supra note 50, at 1196 (noting that far more unmarried women are abortion 
patients than married women, and that abortion patients tend to be younger, most commonly 
twenty- to twenty-four years old); GUTTMACHER INST., AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 23–25 (2008), http://www.guttmacher.org/presentations/abort_slides.pdf (showing 
that women age twenty- to twenty-four have the highest abortion rates, and that approximately 
sixty-seven percent of abortion patients were never married). 
58. Adler et al., supra note 50, at 1198, 1202; Martucci, supra note 55, at 58−59 (reporting lower 
depression and anxiety in women who had abortions relative to control groups). 
59. See Blumenthal, supra note 48, for further discussion of this point. Of course, when the 
number of abortions is high, even a small percentage of women suffering such negative reactions 
can reflect a large absolute number. E.g., Susan C. Turell et al., Emotional Response to Abortion: A 
Critical Review of the Literature, 9 WOMEN & THERAPY 49, 65 (1990).  
60. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 968 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting such multiple goals and stating 
that “this required presentation of ‘balanced information’ is rationally related to the State’s 
legitimate interest in ensuring that the woman’s consent is truly informed, and in addition furthers 
the State’s interest in preserving unborn life”) (citation omitted); Richard Stith, Location and Life: 
How Stenberg v. Carhart Undercut Roe v. Wade, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 255, 265 n.43 
(2002) (noting that “although Casey definitely permits the state to take the pro-life side in seeking to 
dissuade people from abortion, the three-Justice opinion assumes that all informed consent materials 
will be ‘truthful and not misleading’ and ‘aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, 
even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion’”) (citation 
omitted). 
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (stating that “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it”). 
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Casey, therefore, condones an effort to persuade a woman not to have an 
abortion, but that effort must be communicated through a truthful and 
non-misleading message. More specifically, there is a line the State may 
not cross in its efforts to persuade. Consistent with Roe v. Wade, of 
course, the State may not physically coerce a woman into not having an 
abortion, in the sense that it may not invade her bodily autonomy.62 But 
neither may the State psychologically coerce—that is, a State must also 
stop short of establishing procedures that place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman’s decision-making process.63 When such State 
action “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make [the 
abortion] decision,” the State’s conduct crosses that line, invading “the 
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”64 This focus 
on a woman’s ability to make her decision is important: when the State 
constrains that ability, that constraint serves as an obstacle to her 
decision-making process.65 Accordingly, Casey seems “to adopt a 
standard permitting ‘persuasive but not too overwhelmingly persuasive 
non-false speech.’”66 
But how could a message be too persuasive? At the most extreme, of 
course, the decision might simply be taken away from a woman; this 
literal replacement of a woman’s decision-making with the State’s is the 
strongest example of an overpowering, overly “persuasive” message.67 
Or the message might be simply false. Or, as in some earlier cases, the 
language used in the communication might be so explicitly one-sided 
that the clear intent is for a woman to withhold her consent to an 
abortion, rather than even to pay lip service to the notion of encouraging 
a fully informed, reasoned, decision-making process.68 
                                                     
62. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). In one sense, the State is in fact permitted to take 
that step, when it prohibits most post-viability abortions. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 
(“reaffirm[ing]” the “central holding” of Roe that “a State may not prohibit any woman from 
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability”). The present discussion, 
of course, addresses choices at the earlier stage. 
63. Cf. infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
64. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (emphasis added). 
65. Whether it is a “substantial” obstacle, of course, is another question, the answer to which 
depends on the substance of the message. 
66. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 844. 
67. But see supra note 62.  
68. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984). Eubanks relied on the Akron 
Court’s disapprobation of a State providing information “designed to influence the woman’s 
informed choice between abortion or childbirth.” Id. at 146. After Casey, therefore, the Eubanks 
approach is less tenable. Cf. supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
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The focus of the next Section is empirical research that suggests 
another, more subtle way in which a communication might be “too” 
persuasive: by taking advantage of irrelevant aspects of the message, the 
communicator, or the listener. That is, a message might have the effect 
of being more persuasive than its quality objectively deserves because of 
cues to which the listener is exposed—or because of personal aspects of 
the listener herself—that enhance the message’s strength or distract the 
listener from fully considering and analyzing the message’s quality.69 
My focus is one such irrelevant cue—the emotional state in which the 
listener finds herself while being exposed to the message. 
II. PERSUASION AND “AFFECT”70 
A.  Background 
Substantial empirical research in the social sciences has investigated 
what sort of extraneous or irrelevant cues might unduly or 
inappropriately influence a listener.71 Particularly relevant in this context 
                                                     
69. ENGLISH & SALES, supra note 24, at 53. 
70. The psychological term “affect” is an umbrella term, subsuming both “emotion” and “mood,” 
which are distinguished in the psychological literature. E.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood 
Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2005); Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking 
the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 
101 (2005) (defining “affect,” “emotion,” and “mood”); Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The 
Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 41 (1995) (same). As these sources note, 
“emotions” tend to be more stable, focused, and attributable to a particular source; “moods” tend to 
be more transient, diffuse, and less attributable to particular sources. E.g., Blumenthal, supra, at 3. 
Below, I distinguish between the two concepts, both because of definitional reasons and, more 
importantly, because the two effects on persuasion are quite different. See infra notes 80−82. 
71. For a useful review, see, among others, Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude 
Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
323, 343−66 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds.) (4th ed. 1998). Such extraneous, irrelevant, or 
“peripheral” cues include a speaker’s expertise, e.g., Richard E. Petty et al., Personal Involvement 
as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847 
(1981); Shelley Chaiken & D. Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: 
Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460 (1994); or a speaker’s attractiveness, e.g., Shelley Chaiken, 
The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 3 (M.P. 
Zanna et al. eds., 1987); Sharon Shavitt et al., The Interaction of Endorser Attractiveness and 
Involvement in Persuasion Depends on the Goal That Guides Message Processing, 3 J. CONSUMER 
PSYCHOL. 137 (1994); or a speaker’s sex, e.g., Phillip Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against 
Women?, 5 TRANSACTION 28 (1968) (finding an article written by “John McKay” more persuasive 
than the same article written by “Joan McKay”). Peripheral aspects of the message itself can also 
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is empirical research over several decades examining whether emotion 
influences how easily an individual can be persuaded. One of the earliest 
empirical studies examining emotional influences on a person’s 
susceptibility to persuasion, for instance, presented college students with 
political slogans either while they ate a free lunch or while noxious 
smells were released into the experiment room.72 Results showed that 
subjects exposed to the slogans while eating the free lunch (and thus in a 
more positive mood than those exposed to the noxious odors) tended to 
agree more with the slogans they heard.73 Building from that original 
work, a robust body of research has developed over the last several 
decades that supports the important general finding that individuals in 
positive moods tend to be more susceptible to persuasion than those in 
neutral or negative moods.74 
                                                     
lead to more persuasion. E.g., Stephen M. Smith & David R. Shaffer, Speed of Speech and 
Persuasion: Evidence for Multiple Effects, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1051 (1995) 
(faster speech can be more persuasive depending on the message’s level of personal relevance); 
Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelley Chaiken, The Effect of Message Framing on Breast Self-
Examination Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 500 (1987) 
(noting that negatively framed messages can be more persuasive than comparable positively framed 
messages). And, irrelevant characteristics of the listener can affect the persuasiveness of a 
communication, such as a listener’s sex, age, intelligence, or need for cognition. See, e.g., Alice H. 
Eagly & Wendy Wood, Explaining Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Meta-analytic 
Perspective, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 306, 307 (1991) (noting the small tendency 
for women to be more persuadable than men); Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of 
the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993) (noting 
increased suggestibility of younger children); Nancy Rhodes & Wendy Wood, Self-Esteem and 
Intelligence Affect Influenceability: The Mediating Role of Message Reception, 111 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 156 (1992) (noting that the listener’s increased intelligence is generally associated with 
decreased persuasion); Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al., Need for Cognition and Advertising: 
Understanding the Role of Personality Variables in Consumer Behavior, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 
239 (1992) (noting that those high in need for cognition tend to be less influenced by simple 
peripheral cues). 
72. G.H.S. Razran, Conditioned Response Changes in Rating and Appraising Sociopolitical 
Slogans, 37 PSYCHOL. BULL. 481 (1940). 
73. Id. 
74. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 70, at 6 (noting tendency); Richard E. Petty et al., Positive Mood 
and Persuasion: Different Roles for Affect Under High- and Low-Elaboration Conditions, 64 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1993); Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Social Judgments: An 
Introductory Review, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 3, 17 (Joseph P. Forgas ed. 1991) 
(noting “considerable experimental evidence for the beneficial effects of positive mood on the 
acceptance of persuasive messages”); Diane M. Mackie & Leila T. Worth, Feeling Good, But Not 
Thinking Straight: The Impact of Positive Mood on Persuasion, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL 
JUDGMENTS 201–02 (Joseph P. Forgas ed. 1991); Gerd Bohner et al., Affect and Persuasion: Mood 
Effects on the Processing of Message Content and Context Cues and on Subsequent Behaviour, 22 
EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 511, 513 (1990); Herbert Bless et al., Mood and Persuasion: A 
Cognitive Response Analysis, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331 (1990) (noting that 
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One traditional explanation for such findings relies on a “mood-
regulation” hypothesis, which suggests that someone in a positive mood 
is motivated not to process incoming stimuli or information too deeply, 
lest such analysis take her out of that good mood.75 Someone in a 
negative mood, however, is likely to process incoming stimuli or 
information relatively more deeply.76 According to this approach, 
positive mood involves looser, more superficial, heuristic cognitive 
processing of a message or communication—that is, less processing and 
in less depth—relative to someone in a neutral or negative mood.77 
Though this model has recently been refined somewhat,78 the finding 
that positive and negative moods have different effects on such cognitive 
information processing is a robust phenomenon. 
Why, then, do statements such as the following appear in the legal 
literature: “when people are anxious and fearful, they are less likely to 
engage in systematic processing”?79 On the face of it, this directly 
contradicts the substantial research showing that positive mood elicits a 
more heuristic, less systematic analysis of a communication. 
The most important reason, qualified somewhat below, involves the 
distinction made above between mood and emotion.80 Most of the 
                                                     
happy subjects are more persuadable than sad subjects). 
75. See Blumenthal, supra note 70, at 5 n.27 (citing sources). 
76. See id. 
77. See Joseph P. Forgas, Feeling and Doing: Affective Influences on Interpersonal Behavior, 13 
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1 (2002); Jaihyun Park & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Mood and Heuristics: The 
Influence of Happy and Sad States on Sensitivity and Bias in Stereotyping, 78 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1005 (2000); Norbert Schwarz et al., Mood and Persuasion: Affective States 
Influence the Processing of Persuasive Communications, 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 161 (1991); Mackie & Worth, supra note 74; Herbert Bless et al., supra note 74; NEAL 
FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 240 (2000). 
78. E.g., Joseph P. Forgas, Introduction: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition, in FEELING AND 
THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 15−17 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) 
(noting traditional perspective that positive mood leads to more superficial processing and negative 
mood to more systematic processing, but also noting refinements of these perspectives); Dolores 
Albarracín & G. Tarcan Kumkale, Affect as Information in Persuasion: A Model of Affect 
Identification and Discounting, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 (2003) (identifying 
curvilinear effect of mood on such processing); Petty & Wegener, supra note 71, at 364−65 
(identifying and explaining experiments showing that “happy people do not universally process 
information less than neutral or sad people”); cf. Blumenthal, supra note 48, at 29–30 (noting 
importance of distinguishing among different emotions). 
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2003) 
(emphasis added); Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 
1565 (2004) (emphasis added). 
80. See supra note 70. 
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research demonstrating debilities in processing that result from positive 
affect—and that result in increased persuasion—involve the effect of 
mood. In these studies, the affect experienced by individuals hearing a 
communication was unrelated to the content of the message in question. 
In contrast, negative emotion—such as anxiety or fear—that stems from 
the message itself can lead to increased susceptibility to persuasion.81 
Specifically, “fear-based appeals,” where the induced emotion stems 
from the message rather than from an unrelated stimulus, and the sort of 
politicized message that is likely to be conveyed in this context, are focal 
in the present discussion. Indeed, “perhaps the most notable instances in 
which negative moods have produced more favorable attitudes reside in 
the vast literature on fear appeals.”82 
B. Fear Appeals and Persuasion 
Hundreds of empirical studies on the effect of fear (or threat) appeals 
have appeared since the early 1950s, when the paradigm was first 
extensively developed.83 Most simply, a “fear appeal” is a fear-arousing 
persuasive message. More specifically, it is a message or argument that 
usually (1) suggests to the listener that he or she is vulnerable to a 
specific threat and (2) urges the listener to undertake specific actions to 
reduce his or her vulnerability to that threat.84 One leading fear appeals 
researcher, Professor Kim Witte, defines fear appeals similarly: 
“persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible 
things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message 
recommends.”85 
Professor Witte further explains fear appeals in terms of three central 
concepts: threat, fear, and efficacy.86 Threat is the external stimulus that 
                                                     
81. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
82. Richard E. Petty et al., Multiple Roles for Affect in Persuasion, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL 
JUDGMENTS 181, 183 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991). 
83. See James Price Dillard & Jason W. Anderson, The Role of Fear in Persuasion, 21 PSYCHOL. 
& MARKETING 909 (2004). 
84. Franklin J. Bolster & Paul Mongeau, Fear-Arousing Persuasive Messages, in 
COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 8 330, 371 n.1 (Robert N. Bostrom ed. 1984) (“A fear appeal is an 
argument of the following form: (1) You (the listener) are vulnerable to a threat. (2) If you are 
vulnerable, then you should take action to reduce your vulnerability. (3) If you are to reduce your 
vulnerability, then you must accept the recommendations contained in this message. (4) Therefore 
you should accept the recommendations contained in this message.”). 
85. Kim Witte, Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals: The Extended Parallel Process Model, 
59 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 329, 329 (1992). 
86. Id. at 330−32. 
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exists outside of the listener’s perception, which, if perceived by the 
listener as significant and likely to affect him or her, elicits fear. Fear is 
defined as a “negatively-valenced emotion, accompanied by a high level 
of arousal,” and is the listener’s subjective emotional reaction to the 
threat.87 Finally, efficacy relates to the part of the message that conveys 
the availability and effectiveness of the recommended action and the 
listener’s subjective perceptions with respect to this part of the 
message.88 As with the concept of threat, the concept of efficacy 
incorporates both objective and subjective elements of fear appeals. 
Professor Witte has synthesized much of the previous research on fear 
appeals, combining earlier studies’ discrepant results into a more 
coherent framework: the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM).89 
Professor Witte’s major concern in developing this new theory was that 
fear had been de-emphasized in fear appeals research.90 Drawing on 
previous influential (but ultimately incomplete) models, Professor Witte 
suggested that fear appeals engender two processes, or appraisals, in the 
minds of listeners: (1) appraisal of the threat, and (2) appraisal of the 
efficacy of the recommended response.91 These appraisal processes 
occur successively, rather than simultaneously; that is, after exposure to 
the message, a listener will first internally appraise the threat as she 
perceives it by assessing the severity of the threat and her susceptibility 
to that threat.92 If the listener does not perceive the threat to be at least 
moderate, or does not believe that she is particularly susceptible to the 
threat, then she will not be motivated to appraise or undertake any 
recommended response, and the fear appeal fails.93 If the listener 
perceives both severity and susceptibility as high, then fear is elicited 
and she will be motivated to undergo an internal appraisal of the efficacy 
                                                     
87. Id. at 331. 
88. Id. at 332. 
89. Id. at 337. 
90. Id. 
91. Kim Witte, Fear as Motivator, Fear as Inhibitor: Using the Extended Parallel Process Model 
to Explain Fear Appeal Successes and Failures, in HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION AND 
EMOTION: RESEARCH, THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CONTEXTS 423, 428 (Peter A. Andersen & 
Laura K. Guerrero eds. 1998) [hereinafter Fear as Motivator]; Witte, supra note 85, at 337−38. 
92. Witte, Fear as Motivator, supra note 91; Witte, supra note 85, at 337−39; see Enny H.H.J. 
Das et al., Fear Appeals Motivate Acceptance of Action Recommendations: Evidence for a Positive 
Bias in the Processing of Persuasive Messages, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 650, 654 
(2003) (demonstrating that listeners who perceived themselves to be highly vulnerable to a health 
threat were more easily persuaded to adopt recommended responses). 
93. Witte, Fear as Motivator, supra note 91; Witte, supra note 85, at 337−39. 
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of the recommended response.94 In appraising the efficacy of that 
response, the listener determines whether such a response will 
effectively assuage the perceived threat and whether she has the ability 
to perform that action.95 
At this stage, depending on the perceived levels of efficacy, other 
processes take over. If perceived efficacy is high (i.e., the listener 
believes that the recommended response will effectively assuage the 
threat), the listener engages in the danger control process, focusing on 
averting the threat conveyed in the fear appeal.96 In this case, listeners 
generally adopt the recommended response. However, if the perceived 
efficacy is low (i.e., the listener does not believe the recommended 
response will effectively assuage the threat), then the listener engages in 
a fear control process, focusing not on averting the threat but rather on 
ways to cope with the fear itself.97 In this case, listeners generally reject 
the recommended response and either deny the existence of the threat or 
attribute manipulative intent to the source of the message.98 
In sum, the EPPM suggests a sequence of perceived threat, fear, 
perceived efficacy, and acceptance of recommended responses or 
persuasion. More specifically, the EPPM suggests the following: the 
higher the perceived threat, the more fear elicited; the more fear elicited, 
the more likely a listener is to appraise the efficacy of the recommended 
responses; the higher the perceived efficacy, the more likely a listener is 
to adopt the recommended responses. Where perceived efficacy is low, 
however, it is less likely a listener will adopt recommended responses 
due to defensive avoidance. In other words, where threat and efficacy 
are perceived to be high, recommended responses are usually followed. 
The EPPM thus predicts that if the perceived efficacy of the 
recommended response is low, fear is less likely to lead to persuasion. 
Rather, the fear-control process is engaged—denial, perceived 
manipulation—and the recommended response is not adopted. Other 
                                                     
94. Witte, Fear as Motivator, supra note 91; Witte, supra note 85, at 337−39. As Witte notes, 
experiencing fear may elevate perception of the threat, which may elevate fear, continuing in a 
cycle. Id. at 338.  
95. See Witte, Fear as Motivator, supra note 91, at 428−29. 
96. Witte, supra note 85, at 340. 
97. Id. at 340−41. 
98. Id. Of course, individual differences, including background, personality traits, personal 
experiences, etc., influence a listener’s appraisal of threat and efficacy, thereby indirectly affecting 
the ultimate decision to respond in an adaptive or maladaptive manner. Id. at 338; Witte, Fear as 
Motivator, supra note 91, at 430−31. Thus, the same fear appeal may affect people differently 
depending on these variables. 
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empirical research, however, may qualify that prediction in ways 
directly relevant to the abortion decision-making process. In particular, 
engagement of the fear-control process—and thus the likelihood of 
adopting the recommended response—may depend on the perceived 
credibility of the party recommending that response.99 Specifically, 
when listeners hear a fear message from a credible source, they are less 
likely to engage in a fear-control process whereby they perceive 
manipulation, engage in counter-argumentation, or use other defensive 
avoidance tactics.100 Rather, listeners are more likely to engage in a 
danger-control process and accept the recommended responses.101 Thus, 
when listeners perceive the source of a fear appeal to have high 
credibility, they are generally more persuaded to comply with the 
recommended responses. 
Finally, research indicates that whether a health message is framed 
positively or negatively can affect the perceived risk of not following the 
relevant suggestions, the perceived costs of doing so, and the 
persuasiveness of the message itself.102 That is, when a message is 
framed in a way that presents the outcome as a gain—e.g., by making a 
particular choice, you will be physically and psychologically  
healthy—individuals in a negative mood will be more likely to see 
                                                     
99. Brian Sternthal & C. Samuel Craig, Fear Appeals: Revisited and Revised, 1 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 22, 26−27 (1974) (noting studies that indicate a correlation between high source credibility and 
message acceptance); cf. Murray A. Hewgill & Gerald R. Miller, Source Credibility and Response 
to Fear-Arousing Communications, 32 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 95, 99 (1965) (suggesting that a 
highly credible source with value to a listener presenting a strong fear appeal leads to more 
persuasion). 
100. Sternthal & Craig, supra note 99, at 27. 
101. Id. 
102. Punam Anand Keller et al., Affect, Framing, and Persuasion, 40 J. MARKETING RES. 54 
(2003) (positing that those in positive moods are more persuaded by loss-framed messages, whereas 
those in negative moods are more persuaded by gain-framed messages). Others report somewhat 
discrepant findings. For instance, for individuals high in “need-for-cognition,” a negative mood 
(sadness) led to more agreement with a message counseling particular action when the message was 
framed in terms of loss (if you don’t do X, bad things will happen). When framed in terms of gains 
(if you do X, good things will happen), however, positive mood (happiness) led to more agreement 
with the message. Duane T. Wegener et al., Effects of Mood on High Elaboration Attitude Change: 
The Mediating Role of Likelihood Judgments, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 25 (1994). More generally, 
the framing effect may relate to whether a health message is framed in terms of prevention or 
detection; gain-framed prevention messages and loss-framed detection messages seem to be most 
persuasive. Susan E. Rivers et al., Message Framing and Pap Test Utilization among Women 
Attending a Community Health Clinic, 10 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 65 (2005). 
01_BLUMENTHAL_FINAL.DOC 2/29/2008 10:56:03 AM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:1, 2008 
20 
increased risks, lowered costs, and to be persuaded into accepting the 
recommendations.103 
In sum, people are most persuaded by fear appeals that (1) come from 
a credible source (such as a doctor or health care professional), (2) 
convey severe and relevant threats (such as the physical or psychological 
risks to a mother and/or the risks to a fetus), and (3) provide effective 
and feasible responses (such as choosing not to abort).104 
C. Application to Informed Consent Statutes 
Many of the informed consent abortion statutes include these three 
elements. Many states require that women seeking abortions at the very 
least be informed of the general nature and associated medical risks of 
the procedure. Some states, however, require that women be informed of 
specific risks, such as hemorrhaging, endometritis, perforated uterus, 
danger to subsequent pregnancies, and infertility.105 Most women are 
likely to view such threats as severe, and most certainly as relevant. 
Similarly, informing women of an increased risk of breast cancer, or of 
the risks of incomplete or failed abortion, or of potential emotional and 
psychological trauma, would likely have the same effect: women would 
justifiably perceive these risks as severe and relevant threats (the second 
element above). Information about “risks” to the fetus would also be 
seen as relevant threats. Such information might be explicit, such as 
regarding an incomplete abortion. It might be more subtle, such as 
information about the fetus’s gestational age, its anatomical and 
physiological characteristics, or its brain and heart function—all 
information that implies the results that an abortion would have on a 
fetus with those physical characteristics. 
Finally, such informed consent laws suggest effective and feasible 
means by which women can avoid the risks or threats identified (the 
                                                     
103. When the message is framed as a loss—e.g., “you will suffer such physical or psychological 
dysfunction”—individuals in a positive mood are more persuaded. Keller et al., supra note 102. 
104. Professor Richard Perloff gives a similar summary of what “works” for fear appeals. 
RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDES IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 195−96 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the following four “practical suggestions”: 
“Communicators must scare the heck out of recipients”; “Persuaders must discuss solutions, as well 
as problems”; “Efficacy recommendations should emphasize costs of not taking precautionary 
actions, as well as benefits of undertaking the activity”; and “Threats and recommendations should 
be salient—or relevant—to the target audience”) (emphasis omitted). Each of these features, of 
course, is emphasized in the informed consent information being discussed. 
105. See supra notes 38−39. 
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third element above). Currently, seventeen states require that women be 
informed that there are alternatives to abortion.106 Again, Utah is the 
most explicit as to the preference for adoption, but most of these states 
require that women be given a list of adoption agencies with a 
description of their services and their contact information,107 thereby 
providing an alternative response to the pregnancy that would effectively 
remove the risks or threats associated with abortion. Moreover, 
providing a list of adoption agencies and contact information makes the 
alternative response of adoption seem more feasible. 
Many states also require that women be informed of the availability 
of medical assistance benefits and of the father’s support obligations.108 
This information implicitly advocates childbirth and child-rearing as an 
alternative response to the pregnancy, which would also effectively 
remove any risk or threat associated with abortion. Moreover, the states 
represent this alternative response to pregnancy as feasible by including 
information aimed at making women feel that they will be able to afford 
this alternative response. Thus, the recommended response to the 
situation—not aborting—is presented as an effective way of combating 
the presented threats or risks of abortion. 
According to the EPPM, however, if a woman is not persuaded that 
these alternatives are effective, then she may engage in fear control 
processing (defensive avoidance, attribution of manipulation, etc.). If, 
however, the source of the message is seen as highly credible, this 
tendency to engage in fear control processing may be overcome. In 
particular, every state with an informed consent abortion law requires 
that the physician or other health care professionals responsible for 
performing the procedure provide the various required information to 
women seeking abortions. In addition, many states require that women 
                                                     
106. ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-4, 26-23A-5 (2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.16.060, 18.05.032 (2006); 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-903, 20-16-904 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794 (2006); IDAHO 
CODE § 18-609 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709, 65-6710 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 311.725 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.6 (2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039 
(2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-738.2, 1-
738.3 (West 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3208 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-
41-330, 44-41-340 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. §§ 171.012, 171.014 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5 (2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2004). 
107. See supra note 106. 
108. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(a); ALASKA STAT. § 18.05.032(a)(5); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
16-903(b)(3)(B); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(2)(B); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(2)(B); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.6(B)(2)(a)(iii). 
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either be given or informed of the availability of printed or video 
materials published by the state.109 Here, women must be verbally 
informed that the materials were published by the state.110 Therefore, the 
two sources of the message containing the threat are health care 
professionals and state governments. Health care professionals are 
typically seen as highly credible (the first element above);111 and trust in 
state government, though it varies considerably, can be strong as well.112 
There is little question that the goal of many of these informed 
consent laws is dissuading women from pursuing abortions, and they are 
likely somewhat successful.113 But although some research (primarily in 
the form of surveys and interviews) has investigated factors influencing 
                                                     
109. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-903; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3; IDAHO CODE § 18-609. 
110. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-903; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3; IDAHO CODE § 18-609. 
111. E.g., PollingReport.com Values, http://www.pollingreport.com/values.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2008) (reporting Harris Poll results from 1998, 2002, and 2006, showing that doctors are 
consistently rated as “generally trust[worthy]”). See also Brief for the American Psychological 
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902)1992 WL 12006399 at *23 (arguing that when a health care 
provider offers information to a patient, “that offer carries the weight of a recommendation. A 
patient may justifiably conclude that a health care provider would not offer her material that was not 
relevant and meaningful to her medical procedure. In practice and effect, [requiring the provision of 
information can] [exploit] the trust critical to the health care provider-patient relationship”). 
112. E.g., Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, A Partisan Public Agenda (Jan. 16, 
1997), available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=544  (noting that seventy 
percent of Pennsylvania respondents have “a great deal” or “a fair amount” of trust in state 
government); Public Policy Institute of California, Special Survey of Orange County (Dec. 2003), 
available at http://data.lib.uci.edu/ocs/2003/report/03attitudestowstategov.html (noting a January 
2002 survey showing that forty-seven percent of California respondents believe state government 
does “what is right just about always or most of the time”). 
113. Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion’s Pain: Can Fetal Pain Legislation Survive the New 
Judicial Scrutiny of Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171, 178 n.32 (2005) 
(stating that “it is likely that some women will change their minds about procuring an abortion when 
they discover that the living being growing inside of them is capable of experiencing pain”); April 
L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women and 
Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 751 n.119 (2004) (noting 
“‘informed consent’ stipulations meant to change women’s minds about abortion”); David C. 
Reardon, Ph.D., Abortion Decisions and the Duty to Screen: Clinical, Ethical, and Legal 
Implications of Predictive Risk Factors of Post-Abortion Maladjustment, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 33, 67 (2003) (suggesting that clinics’ “identification of risks might cause some women 
to change their minds”); Daniel Avila, The Right to Choose, Neutrality, and Abortion Consent in 
Massachusetts, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 513−14 (2005) (quoting abortion provider Dr. Philip G. 
Stubblefield, testifying in Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. 215 (D. 
Mass. 1980), that “a small percentage [of women seeking abortions], 1−3%, might change their 
minds” if they read a consent form “describing the embryo in terms of size and mass at certain 
times, and relating times at which heart beat, movement and full development is reached”). 
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women’s abortion decisions,114 there is surprisingly little empirical 
research on the influence of anti-abortion information on women’s 
abortion decisions. One study examined the effect of explicitly 
informing women that the center they were visiting was a pro-life center, 
that the counselors and staff advocated a pro-life philosophy, that they 
might be shown a “graphic videotape” of an abortion during their visit, 
and that most staff members were trained volunteers as opposed to 
professional counselors.115 A comparison group was not told this 
information. Both groups then met with center staff and were asked 
afterward about their “intent to abort,” but no significant differences 
emerged between the two groups.116 There was also no difference 
between groups as to whether women chose to view the abortion 
videotape.117 
The authors suggested that based on their findings, “providing open, 
informed consent prior to initiation of services does not bias the client in 
favor of pro-abortion decisions”; in fact, it helps “facilitat[e] client 
autonomy and self-determination.”118 It is not clear, however, how much 
to make of the findings. The more important constitutional question, for 
instance, would be whether the “graphic videotape portraying an 
abortion” had an effect on the women’s decision-making, rather than 
information about the center’s philosophical orientation or that they 
might see such a videotape. The authors did not report this information, 
though (and the number of women who chose to view the tape was too 
small to generalize from in any case).119 Similarly, those in the 
“enhanced informed consent” condition were explicitly told that “the 
principal goal of the center was to try to stop abortions.”120 But as the 
                                                     
114. E.g., S. Marie Harvey et al., The Relationship of Contextual Factors to Women’s 
Perceptions of Medical Abortion, 23 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 654 (2002); Roni Gagin et 
al., The Decision-Making Process for Requests for Late Termination of Pregnancy in Israel, 26 
HEALTH & SOC. WORK 98 (2001); Myrna L. Friedlander et al., Abortion: Predicting the Complexity 
of the Decision-Making Process, 9 WOMEN & HEALTH 43 (1984). 
115. Kathryn Mardirosian et al., The Effects of Enhanced Informed Consent in a Pro-Life 
Pregnancy Counseling Center, 69 J. COUNSELING & DEVELOPMENT 39, 40 (1990). 
116. Id. at 40, 41 tbl.1. There was a non-statistically significant finding that women in the 
“enhanced informed consent” were slightly more likely to report an intent to abort (mean = 4.13, 
standard deviation = 1.31 for enhanced condition; mean = 3.83, standard deviation = 1.32 for 
standard condition). 
117. Id. at 40. Three out of thirty chose to view the video in the “enhanced informed consent” 
group; five out of thirty chose to in the standard condition. Id. 
118. Id. at 41. 
119. Id. at 40. 
120. Id. 
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authors pointed out, women may already have been aware of this “basic 
philosophy or bias prior to their arrival for services.”121 Thus, although it 
is a clear benefit that the center did not engage in “explicit misleading 
advertising (e.g., suggesting it that was an abortion clinic),”122 as the 
authors suggested some centers might, it is not as clear whether their 
findings in fact address the question raised here. 
Anecdotal evidence, however, does suggest that the sort of 
information that might be provided under the statutes can have a 
profound effect on women seeking abortions. Abortion-rights advocates 
have long criticized the sort of “fake abortion clinics” that the 
researchers above disavowed—centers that advertise abortion counseling 
and related services, but which in fact promote a pro-life philosophy and 
seek to discourage women from pursuing abortions.123 Abortion-rights 
advocates have sought federal legislation prohibiting such practices, and 
one such bill was introduced in Congress in early 2006.124 Stories from 
such centers suggest not only strong emotional impacts on women but 
also changes in their decision-making about the abortion. 
Professor Julie Mertus, for instance, identifies one woman who “was 
told that the doctor would make her touch her dismembered baby, that 
the pain would be the most horrible she could imagine, and that she 
might, after an abortion, never be able to have children.”125 Another 
woman was told, after asking for pregnancy test results, that she  
would have to see a slide-show about abortion first. It started 
with nice music and pictures of women walking through fields. 
Then you saw a wastebasket full of dead fetuses. And then there 
was a slide of what they said was a dead woman lying under a 
sheet . . . They kept saying that you were going to die.126 
                                                     
121. Id. at 41. 
122. Id. 
123. E.g., Julie A. Mertus, Challenging Fake Abortion Clinics: Protecting Women’s Privacy 
Interests Without Violating the First Amendment, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547 
(1986−1987); Michael Alison Chandler, Antiabortion Centers Offer Sonograms to Further Cause, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2006, at A1. 
124. For the text of the House bill introduced in the 109th Congress that would allow Federal  
Trade Commission regulation of “deceptive” practices intended to suggest that a center  
provides abortion services if it does not, see H.R. 5052, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov/documents/reproductivechoice/033006CPCbill.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 
2008). 
125. Mertus, supra note 123, at 554 (citation omitted). 
126. Id. at 554−55 (citation omitted). 
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Not all centers are so extreme. Nor is the information provided under 
State auspices always—or even typically—of this sort (though some 
states may approach such graphic detail). Many centers, however, both 
private and State-sponsored, suggest the possibility of negative long-
term psychological effects to their patients.127 Both suggest the 
possibility of increased risk for breast cancer after abortion.128 And, both 
provide ultrasound services; in many instances, simply being given a 
sonogram seems to change a woman’s mind about pursuing an 
abortion.129 This is, of course, not the same as graphic videotapes and 
warnings of health risks,130 but it does illustrate the real possibility of 
susceptibility to decision-changing information. Indeed, South 
Carolina’s legislature recently introduced a bill that would require a 
woman seeking an abortion to view an ultrasound image before 
undergoing the procedure.131 Proponents view the bill as a “natural 
addition to the state’s informed-consent law;” however, critics object 
that it is “an attempt to restrict abortion by scaring and intimidating 
women.”132 
Of course, non-deceptive influences—that is, “truthful and not 
misleading” influences—on decision-making can be appropriate, but in 
                                                     
127. See supra notes 40−41 (Nevada and Wisconsin statutes); Rockville Pregnancy Center, 
http://www.rcpc.org/checklist.html (suggesting that “abortion carries possible emotional, mental 
and psychological trauma and/or stress”) (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
128. See supra note 38 (Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas statutes); Rockville Pregnancy Center, 
supra note 127 (noting the “risk” of “breast cancer linkage (especially if your family history 
involves breast cancer)”). The weight of scientific evidence finds no such link. See supra note 38. 
129. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 145 n. 121 
(1992) (noting that one amicus brief in Casey mentioned “women who were contemplating having 
abortions who decided against doing so after an ultrasound procedure, since ‘seeing what was inside 
of them changed their mind’”); Chandler, supra note 123 (“A 2005 survey by Care Net, a Sterling-
based network of about 1,000 antiabortion pregnancy centers in the United States and Canada, 
found that 72 percent of women who were initially ‘strongly leaning’ toward abortion decided to 
carry their pregnancies to term after seeing a sonogram. Fifty percent made the same choice after 
counseling alone.”). 
130. But see Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 291 (2006) 
(noting that anti-abortion activists have incorporated fetal imagery techniques into their advocacy). 
Indeed, increasingly, parents are being given the option to obtain three-dimensional ultrasounds, an 
opportunity such activists seek to take advantage of to support their position. Id. Even four-
dimensional ultrasounds—essentially “animated,” real-time, three-dimensional recordings of a 
fetus’s movements—are now available. E.g., Jennifer M. Uhles, Comment, Unsound Ultrasounds?, 
28 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 265 (2007). 
131. Seanna Adcox, S.C. Bill Would Require Ultrasounds Before Abortion, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2007, at A6. 
132. Id. 
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deciding their constitutionality, the influence of emotional factors must 
be taken into account.133 Twenty years ago Professor Mertus suggested, 
though without empirical support, that “[e]xposure to such treatment, 
without consent and while in a stressful and anxious state, jeopardizes 
women’s ability to weigh their options rationally and make independent, 
informed decisions regarding abortion.”134 I make an analogous point 
here, and provide the empirical basis. 
I do not mean that state clinics providing statutorily prescribed 
information must be subject to tort liability of the sort that Professor 
Mertus suggested. Nor do I mean that the simple act of conducting an 
ultrasound constitutes some “undue burden” under Casey. But, the sort 
of information provided by the fake abortion clinics at times does mirror 
the sort provided by the State. More important, in light of what we now 
know about the effect of fear appeals and persuasion under the influence 
of anxiety, there is a legitimate case for closer scrutiny under Casey of 
the effect such State-provided information has on the decision-making of 
women seeking abortion—even when such information is truthful. 
D. Summary 
Empirical research demonstrates that people tend to be more easily 
persuaded in negative emotional states, particularly when they are 
anxious or fearful. When an individual feels vulnerable to a particular 
health risk, she is more persuaded by an argument in favor of how to 
manage it, regardless of the argument’s strength—that is, the emotion 
and vulnerability are more influential than the message.135 Those who 
feel vulnerable experience significantly more negative emotions as a 
result of hearing the communications, which leads to increased 
persuasion.136 Indeed, perhaps the most effective means of obtaining 
compliance in the context of a fear appeal is to augment a listener’s 
                                                     
133. For an analogous approach see Huang, supra note 70 (suggesting that courts should pay 
greater attention to the emotional impact of stock prospectuses on investment decision-making). 
134. Mertus, supra note 123, at 555 (emphasis added). 
135. Das et al., supra note 92. Das and colleagues show that when a person feels vulnerable, her 
focus goes toward “positive aspects of the action recommendation,” and vulnerability biases her 
“evaluation of the evidence presented in support of the recommended action.” Id. at 661. For 
instance, vulnerability can increase the desire to get more information about how to deal with a 
threat, which can increase perceived efficacy (ability to deal with threat); thus, both vulnerability 
and perceived efficacy can lead to more compliance with recommended action. See also Bolster & 
Mongeau, supra note 84 (defining fear appeals consistent with this approach). 
136. See Das et al., supra note 92, at 654, 658, 661. 
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perceived efficacy, i.e., to make clear that an individual has a specific 
way to deal with the perceived danger.137 Applying this research to the 
abortion context illustrates the potential for an informed consent statute 
to be an impermissible burden on the exercise of a woman’s autonomous 
decision-making about an abortion precisely because it is calculated to 
bias a woman’s free choice, not inform it. 
III.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
I suggest that although Casey condones State efforts to persuade a 
woman to forego an abortion in favor of childbirth, the opinion’s 
“truthful and not misleading” language can be read more broadly than it 
traditionally has. Specifically, even a truthful message may be 
misleading when it inappropriately takes advantage of emotional 
influence to bias an individual’s decision away from the decision that 
would be made in a non-emotional, fully informed state.138 Drawing on 
the insights of empirical research, I suggest that the sort of emotional 
information that many States now provide in their “informed consent” 
statutes can lead to such inappropriate emotional influence and thus 
should be examined more closely than heretofore. 
One gap in this argument is the lack of empirical investigation of the 
particular effect I suggest. Despite the anecdotes related above, some 
surveys, and at least tangentially related empirical studies such as that by 
Kathryn Mardirosian and colleagues,139 I have not found direct empirical 
tests of the effect.140 Although my analysis would be further informed by 
such research, it is nevertheless grounded in the language of Casey and 
is supported by the empirical evidence on fear appeals and on the impact 
of negative emotion, vulnerability, source credibility, and perceived 
efficacy on persuasion.141 Thus, the logical basis for the effect is set out 
here; further research can test that hypothesis. 
                                                     
137. See supra notes 89−98. 
138. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1991) (noting that when 
such State action “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make [the abortion] decision,” 
the State’s conduct invades “the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”) 
(emphasis added). 
139. Mardirosian et al., supra note 115. 
140. Even a recent review of “the psychology of abortion” focused primarily on post-abortion 
issues, rather than pre-abortion decision-making. See Coleman et al., supra note 51. 
141. Other empirical research supports the idea that truthful statements can be misleading, in 
particular through its emotional effects. See Huang, supra note 70, at 115 n.89 (reviewing sources). 
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Other concerns or criticisms might also be levied at this approach. 
Some have traction, though none, ultimately, are fatal. 
A. Paternalism 
First, the suggestion that women might be subject to emotional factors 
that bias their decision-making about abortion may be viewed as 
classically paternalistic, suggesting that women are unable to make their 
own decisions and need protection against manipulation.142 It is true that 
such an approach implies the possibility of manipulation. The approach 
also suggests that women’s abortion decisions under emotional stress 
may not reflect the decisions they would make in a less emotional state. 
But both of these suggestions might be accurate without implying any 
defect in women’s actual decision-making. States may, and do, attempt 
to influence women’s decisions about abortion, and the impact of 
emotion on decision-making indicates the potential for  
manipulation—just as with conventional advertising efforts to 
manipulate consumers’ decisions through influencing emotional 
states.143 It may simply be the case that women in this context—like 
other people in other contexts—are susceptible to others taking 
advantage of their emotional state to manipulate their decisions.144 If so, 
                                                     
142. Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 489 (1995) (framing 
Casey as a “paternalis[tic] [decision that] undermines the independence of women as 
decisionmakers and furthers the stereotype that women are emotional and irrational decisionmakers, 
easily swayed by authority figures”); Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The 
Exceptionalism of Doctor-Patient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 171−72 (1998); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, 
Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 425, 456 (2006) (suggesting that for some, “the 
‘informed consent’ requirements in Casey [may] reflect a gender-based paternalism toward 
women”); McClain, supra note 129, at 144 (“The Court’s analysis of informed consent and 
women’s health is patronizing, selective, and in part contrary to fact.”); Heather A. Smith, 
Comment, A New Prescription for Abortion, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2002) 
(“Casey . . . legalizes society’s historically paternalistic approach to women.”). 
143. See Blumenthal, supra note 48, at 47–48; Neal Roese, Counterfactual Thinking and 
Marketing: Introduction to the Special Issue, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 277, 278−79 (2000) 
(“The manipulation of consumer emotions by marketers has long been a stable of successful 
advertising.”); Jon Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 732−33 (1999) (noting use by marketers of positive 
affect to influence and manipulate consumers’ perceptions); Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal 
Perception and the First Amendment: Yelling Fire in a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1243, 
1262 (1990) (“Clever advertising executives appeal to a consumer’s emotional or psychological 
needs . . . .”). 
144. See generally Blumenthal, supra note 48 (noting several examples of people’s susceptibility 
to emotional factors that may warrant intervention when that bias leads to bad decision-making). 
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then, like persons in other contexts, women should have every resource 
to avoid manipulation, including, as relevant here, a broader basis for a 
constitutional challenge. 
B.  The Slippery Slope 
A second objection might be in the “slippery slope” vein, suggesting 
that this approach over-expands the concept of “misleading,” thereby 
making its application possible in an inappropriate range of contexts. 
That is, if truthful communication can be held unconstitutional in the 
abortion context because of the potential for emotional bias, why should 
the same potential not lead to truthful communications being considered 
unlawful in any (or every) other context? 
Of course, this objection rests on the presumption that such expansion 
would in fact be inappropriate. Wholesale expansion would be 
overbroad, but it may be apt to apply the perspective that emotion 
influences decision-making to more areas of legal doctrine. In particular, 
we might consider both the potential for manipulation and the potential 
that even truthful messages can inappropriately make use of emotional 
factors. 
For instance, one commentator has recently suggested protecting 
investors by revising the defenses afforded to those involved in 
securities litigation—in particular, the defense of “puffery” and the 
“total mix” and “bespeaks caution” doctrines—to better reflect 
investors’ actual decision-making.145 Specifically, Professor Peter Huang 
suggests that courts consider not only the cognitive impact that 
prospectuses or other informational material might have on potential 
investors and on shareholders, but also the emotional impact.146 He notes 
that the positive mood induced by “puffery” can lead to more superficial 
processing of a prospectus containing such puffery147 and recommends 
that the affect induced by positive material be considered in evaluating 
how a “reasonable” reader might interpret that material. Similarly, he 
suggests modifying the current “total mix” approach to evaluating the 
materiality of information presented in investment material by including 
evaluation of the “total affect” induced by that information.148 
                                                     
145. Huang, supra note 70. 
146. Id. 
147. Cf. Blumenthal, supra note 48, at 3 n.5 (citing sources). 
148. Huang, supra note 70, at 122. 
01_BLUMENTHAL_FINAL.DOC 2/29/2008 10:56:03 AM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:1, 2008 
30 
In another context, Professor Paul Marrow highlights the potential for 
manipulation in one-sided liquidated damages clauses in contracts for 
the provision of emergency services, emphasizing the “experiential” or 
affective and emotional influences that tend to “impede sound [rational] 
reasoning.”149 He accordingly encourages courts to expand the 
unconscionability doctrine by developing the tort of Consequential 
Procedural Unconscionability,150 which could include efforts by a seller 
or provider who takes deliberate advantage of known emotional biases to 
manipulate a potential buyer. Relatedly, Professors Jon Hanson and 
Douglas Kysar have developed an extensive grounding for applying 
enterprise liability in the context of deliberate manipulation by industry 
and/or advertisers.151 
But even to the extent such suggestions are incorporated into legal 
doctrine, consideration of emotional influences need not be 
unconstrained. The slippery slope argument presumes that courts, 
legislators, and policy-makers will be unable to draw a line between 
those contexts in which applying the emotional manipulation approach is 
appropriate and those where it is not. Of course, this is a difficult 
presumption with which to begin: “the existence of difficult cases does 
not negate the importance of protecting [a] right; reasonable boundaries 
can be drawn to demarcate its scope.”152 And I, as well as others, have 
suggested, broadly, some such lines: drawing from the surrogate 
motherhood and frozen embryo examples, for instance, one approach 
would be to focus on the substantive aspects of the decision.153 The 
personal importance of the abortion decision and the far greater 
involvement of emotional factors might plausibly lead to more serious 
consideration of emotional bias and manipulation than in the context of 
an ordinary business contract.154 
                                                     
149. Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural 
Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 49 n.68 (2003−2004). 
150. Id. at 38 (identifying tort and defining its elements). 
151. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143. 
152. Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 29 
(1986). I acknowledge objections to this approach. E.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the 
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1034 (2003) (suggesting that “[s]lippery slopes may occur 
even when a principled distinction can be drawn between decisions A and B”). 
153. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective 
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 214 (2005) (discussing approach of focusing on substance of the 
contract or decision). 
154. Cf. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable 
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 98−99 (1999). 
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Moreover, as elaborated below, even a strong version of these 
approaches does not entail some sort of strict liability, where bias and 
manipulation are presumed any time that emotion is present. As 
discussed in more detail below, causation will be an important factor to 
establish: not everyone may be susceptible to particular emotional 
manipulation, and not every decision made under an emotional state is 
contrary to that which the decision-maker might otherwise make. Causal 
links must be demonstrated, regardless of whether any of these 
perspectives are applied or whether the approach is broadened. 
C.  Casey Means What It Says 
Third, I do not mean that finding that a statement is influential 
necessarily means that it is an undue burden—that simply because a 
communication works to change a woman’s mind it is therefore 
inappropriate.155 My suggestion is that under Casey’s “truthful and not 
misleading” standard, a communication designed to influence a 
woman’s decision whether to abort may be considered an undue burden 
when it is inappropriately manipulative (deliberately or not) by inducing 
fear or anxiety, or when it inappropriately affects her ability to decide, 
leading to a decision that she would not have made when not under the 
influence of such an emotion.156 
Casey might nevertheless be seen as condoning even such 
manipulation, so long as the message is truthful and accurate.157 That is, 
even such emotional loading might be seen as permissible as long as the 
statements are accurate because such emotional persuasion is simply 
                                                     
Nor do I mean that government efforts to use fear appeals in other contexts—health and safety 
public service advertising, for instance—are necessarily inappropriate. A more detailed discussion 
of the extent to which government may and should justifiably interfere in individuals’ behavior and 
decision-making would be necessary to address such points. That discussion has begun to develop 
in the legal literature; elsewhere I (like others) emphasize that in evaluating such intervention, a 
balancing of the relevant costs and benefits is crucial. See Blumenthal, supra note 48. 
155. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 968 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“That the information might create some 
uncertainty and persuade some women to forgo abortions does not lead to the conclusion that the 
Constitution forbids the provision of such information.”); see also id. at 874 (stating that the fact 
that a regulation simply “has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”). 
156. See id. at 874 (noting that when such State action “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s 
ability to make [the abortion] decision,” the State’s conduct invades “the heart of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause”) (emphasis added). 
157. This was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s point. See id. at 968. 
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another way of encouraging a woman to pursue a particular line of 
conduct—encouragement that Casey expressly allows.158 Under this 
approach, Casey might be seen as simply prohibiting false speech. 
For at least two reasons, though, this reading of Casey may be too 
strict. First, actual manipulation is still inappropriate under Casey.159 
There is no question that a State may require the provision of 
information designed to persuade a woman to pursue childbirth rather 
than abortion. What a State may not do, however, is unduly interfere 
with a woman’s decision about whether to do so.160 Again, under Casey, 
information designed to bias a woman’s decision or that has the effect of 
doing so may constitute an impermissible burden.161 Inappropriately 
biasing a woman’s free choice is precisely the sort of burden on a 
woman’s ability to make her decision that impermissibly “reach[es] into 
the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”162 Second, 
the empirical evidence described above—not considered in Casey, and 
developed extensively since that time—encourages a reconsideration of 
Casey’s implications. The substantial literature on fear appeals and the 
influence of negative emotions such as fear and anxiety induced by a 
particular communication shows the potential for a change in an 
individual’s decision away from what it might have been in a non-
emotional state.163 As the First Circuit recognized in Bellotti and the 
Supreme Court did in Akron and Thornburgh, even true information may 
be inappropriate for someone to hear because of the potential for undue 
influence and for the information to mislead.164 Casey’s overruling of the 
                                                     
158.Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
159. Id. at 876–78. 
160. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“‘[L]iberty,’ if it 
means anything, must entail freedom from governmental domination in making the most intimate 
and personal of decisions.”); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 
684, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (stating that state-mandated procedures that increase 
the cost of obtaining an abortion are unconstitutional if they have “the purpose or effect of forcing 
some women to give up their constitutional right to an abortion”); cf. Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 
908, 911–12 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that State may not “place an undue burden on the execution 
of the woman’s decision”) (emphasis added) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–78)). 
161. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (stating that “the means chosen by the State to further the interest 
in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it”). 
162. See id. at 874. 
163. Again, this is the important point, that the emotion impels the change in decision, not simply 
that a woman changes her mind. This is an issue of proof, the burden of which is properly placed on 
the plaintiff. See infra Part III.D. 
164.  Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1022 & n.29 (1st Cir. 
1981); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983); Thornburgh v. 
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latter two cases failed to take this into account; had the plurality done so, 
it may have reached a holding consistent with constitutional mandates 
and closer to the approach suggested here. 
D.  Issues of Proof 
Again, Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed that the simple fact that a 
woman changes her mind about pursuing an abortion does not imply that 
what prompted her to do so was necessarily improper.165 The key, of 
course, would be to show some link between the communication and the 
generated emotion, and between the generated emotion and the decision. 
That is, “the important judicial analysis will be ascertaining causality, 
both in the link between the defendant’s conduct and the experience of 
the particular biasing emotion or mood, and between the emotion or 
mood and the decision . . . .”166 These links would need to be shown 
either prospectively, under a challenge to particular statutory language, 
or retrospectively, in the context of a woman’s tort or other legal claim 
alleging the manipulation of her abortion decision. 
At least two responses might be appropriate. First, an explicit focus 
on decision and injury causation reflects causes of action sounding in 
tort, in particular, negligence-based informed consent suits against a 
health-care provider for failing to provide particular information that 
would be material to a patient’s decision.167 The discussion here, 
however, implicates an effort to explore the effect particular informed 
consent regulations have on not only the constitutional rights involved in 
pursuing the abortion decision, but also on the decision-making process 
itself. Thus, the inquiry focuses on whether such a regulation places an 
undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. Of course, this inquiry 
may arise retrospectively, where a particular woman is exposed to a 
particular State-mandated communication and as a result of such 
exposure changes her mind about an abortion.168 But, it also may arise 
                                                     
Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1986).  
165. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 968. 
166. See Blumenthal, supra note 48, at 68. A third point might be to show that the decision not to 
have an abortion in fact constituted some injury. This is essentially ascertaining “decision 
causation” and “injury causation.” See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the 
Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 562 n.36 (2000) (explaining the 
distinction). 
167. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 654 (2000). 
168. Indeed, a preference for this as-applied approach seems to be one point of the Supreme 
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prospectively, in an effort to determine whether a particular regulation in 
fact might create an undue burden in a broader range of cases. 
Where that is so, Casey and the more recent Gonzales v. Carhart169  
give some guidance for prospective challenges. If a prospective 
challenge were brought, the Court’s apparent preference is for an as-
applied challenge, where a court can focus on “discrete and well-defined 
instances” in which a “particular condition” would occur that might 
make a provision unduly burdensome.170 The necessary proof would 
involve whether a “large fraction” of women are susceptible to the 
emotional impact of the specific sort of information the statutes 
require.171 
                                                     
Court’s recent abortion decision. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. __ (Apr. 2007) 127 S. Ct. 1610, 
1638–39 (2007) (disapproving of facial challenge); id. at 1650−51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority’s apparent assertion that facial challenges to abortion regulations should not be 
entertained where medical uncertainty exists). 
169. 550 U.S.__ (Apr. 2007), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
170. See id. at 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. Typically, plaintiffs raising a facial statutory 
challenge have significant hurdles to overcome. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987). In the abortion context, though, the stringent requirements for raising a successful facial 
constitutional challenge seem to be slightly relaxed. Specifically, the Casey majority established 
that a law restricting abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence is invalid, if, “in a large 
fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. Focusing on the statute’s “impact 
on those whose conduct it affects,” the Court emphasized that “[t]he proper focus of constitutional 
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” 
Id. at 894. This focus was repeated one year later, when Justice O’Connor (with Justice Souter 
joining) concurred in an order denying a stay while plaintiffs challenging aspects of a State’s 
abortion-regulation statute appealed an adverse ruling. Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 
U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O’Connor & Souter, JJ., concurring in denial of stay pending appeal). 
Justice O’Connor explicitly noted that the lower court’s approach there, requiring challengers to 
“‘show that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged provisions] would be valid’” 
was inconsistent with the “large fraction” approach set down in Casey. Id. (quoting Fargo Women’s 
Health Org. v. Skinner, No. A3-91-95 (D.N.D. Feb. 19, 1993)). Most recently, Carhart addressed 
the issue, noting that there was debate over the proper standard but declined to articulate exactly the 
“heavy burden” standard a plaintiff must meet in raising a facial challenge to an abortion statute. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991)). 
Casey’s language seems to control the difficulty placed in the way of women seeking an abortion 
must unduly burden that “large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant.” Id. (citing 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.) In determining whether that large fraction is burdened, Casey emphasizes 
the “relevance” aspect; that is, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Carhart dissent, Casey 
provides that a potentially burdensome statute must be judged in terms of those women for whom it 
is an “actual,” not an “irrelevant” restriction. Carhart, 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). 
171. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. As I note above, this is the sort of empirical research absent 
from the literature. See supra notes 140−141 and accompanying text. It would also be important to 
investigate whether specific groups of women may be more or less susceptible. 
01_BLUMENTHAL_FINAL.DOC 2/29/2008 10:56:03 AM 
Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion 
35 
Second, to the extent that the injury causation analysis is undertaken, 
courts might analogize to the similar approach proposed in the context of 
securities regulation, as informed by recent research.172 In particular, 
both securities regulation and abortion statutes seek to facilitate full 
disclosure of information presumed to be relevant to making fully 
“informed” decisions.173 Both securities regulation and informed consent 
doctrine focus on “material” information, and both deal with how a 
“reasonable” individual would react and decide in particular 
circumstances, when exposed to certain information.174 But, as Professor 
Huang has pointed out, traditional securities doctrine—like traditional 
informed consent doctrine—rarely considers emotional responses to 
such information (e.g., proxy statements or physician communication) in 
determining materiality and reasonableness.175 Professor Huang 
emphasizes the possibility that the mood induced by investment-related 
communications might influence decisions just as easily as does the 
actual information, and suggests broadening securities law to recognize 
that possibility.176 Importantly, Professor Huang implies that analysis of 
materiality and reasonableness can proceed in the same formal way as it 
has under existing doctrine, but should incorporate considerations of 
potential affective influence.177 Equally, traditional undue burden 
                                                     
172. See Huang, supra note 70, at 129 (noting that not only the discussion of reasonableness and 
materiality in particular, but of affective influences on decision-making in general, “have broader 
implications for many other legal and policy areas”). 
173. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (purpose of SEC’s 
mandatory disclosure requirement is “promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to 
informed investment decisions”); Section I, supra. 
174. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007) (explaining that “material” information is that “to 
which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance” in 
making purchasing decisions); see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(stating a preference for an “objective” standard for decision causation in the informed consent 
context, focusing alliteratively on what a “prudent person in the patient’s position would have 
decided if suitably informed,” and looking at whether adequate disclosure might “reasonably be 
expected” to cause a patient to decline treatment); see also John Kindley, Comment, The Fit 
Between the Elements for an Informed Consent Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking 
Induced Abortion with Increased Breast Cancer Risk, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1595, 1640 (footnotes 
omitted) (“A material risk is by definition one which a reasonable patient would consider significant 
in deciding whether to forego the procedure. A finding of materiality therefore implies that the risk 
has the potential to actually change the patient’s decision, either alone or in combination with other 
factors.”). 
175. See Huang, supra note 70, at 111 (noting that traditional framing of reasonable investor does 
not take into account affective decision-making factors). 
176. See id. at 112. 
177. See id. (stating that “determinations of reasonableness would and should depend not just on 
the cognitive nature and quality of information processing, but also upon the affective nature and 
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analysis can proceed in the same formal way, simply taking into account 
the possibility that the State-mandated communication might unduly 
affect a woman’s decision-making by subjecting her to emotional bias. 
CONCLUSION 
Under existing abortion doctrine, States are permitted to mandate that 
women seeking abortion be presented with a variety of information, 
including information about their health and that of their fetus, and both 
immediate and longer-term risks to such health. Such a mandate is 
permissible even when its clear intent is to dissuade women from 
pursuing the abortion. The Supreme Court condones this approach—
provided the information is “truthful and not misleading”—under the 
rationale of ensuring that women receive all relevant information about 
the abortion process so that they can make the most autonomous, fully 
informed decision. In light of substantial empirical literature in 
psychology and persuasion studies, however, I have suggested here that 
even “truthful” information may nevertheless be misleading when it 
takes advantage of individuals’ likelihood to be inappropriately 
persuaded by emotional biases. That is, empirical research demonstrates 
that individuals tend to be more easily persuaded when in a fearful or 
anxious emotional state—the emotional state most likely to be elicited 
by the information provided. 
Much of that research has developed since the Casey decision. 
Nevertheless, there are hints of the approach I develop here in the 
plurality opinion and in Justice Blackmun’s partial concurrence. For 
instance, the Court’s emphasis on “truthful and not misleading” 
communication suggests on its face that the Court’s concern was to 
prevent States from presenting patently false information to women. But 
as noted above, that concern moved quickly to the emphasis on 
autonomous decision-making.178 Thus, perhaps the emphasis on “truthful 
and not misleading” language was a continuation of earlier recognition 
(e.g., in Bellotti) that a communication can be factually accurate but 
nevertheless still inappropriate. Even if this is the better reading, 
however, the Court’s rationale was not the explanation set forth here—
the likelihood of influencing, through emotional manipulation, 
someone’s ability to be persuaded. 
                                                     
quality of information processing”). 
178. See supra notes 46−47 and accompanying text.  
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A closer link, perhaps, may be found in Justice Blackmun’s partial 
concurrence. First, he too emphasized the continuing vitality of the 
“truthful and not misleading” criterion.179 Second, though, he also 
emphasized that 
[b]ecause the State’s information must be “calculated to inform 
the woman’s free choice, not hinder it,” the measures must be 
designed to ensure that a woman’s choice is “mature and 
informed,” not intimidated, imposed, or impelled. To this end, 
when the State requires the provision of certain information, the 
State may not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict 
“psychological abuse,” designed to shock or unnerve a woman 
seeking to exercise her liberty right.180 
Justice Blackmun sought to ensure that the State be prevented from 
manipulating a woman’s decision-making process—“abusing” her 
psychologically, “shocking” or “unnerving” her in the manner of 
presentation.181 He worried about such manipulation not only in the 
abortion cases but in a broader liberty context,182 and he recognized the 
ability for subtle influence in not only the content but also the “manner” 
by which even truthful information was presented. 
In Casey, Justice Blackmun continued, 
This, for example, would appear to preclude a State from 
requiring a woman to view graphic literature or films detailing 
the performance of an abortion operation.[183] Just as a visual 
preview of an operation to remove an appendix plays no part in 
a physician’s securing informed consent to an appendectomy, a 
preview of scenes appurtenant to any major medical intrusion 
into the human body does not constructively inform the decision 
of a woman of the State’s interest in the preservation of the 
                                                     
179. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
180. Id. at 936 n.7 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
181. See id. 
182. Randall P. Bezanson, Self-Reliance, 71 N.D. L. REV. 29, 34 (1995) (noting Justice 
Blackmun’s concern about “government paternalism that takes the form of shaping the information 
upon which individuals make personal and moral choices, thereby intruding government’s moral 
preferences on the otherwise ‘free’ choices of individuals”). 
183. As evidenced by Utah’s statute, Justice Blackmun was here over-optimistic. See supra notes 
35−37 
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woman’s health or demonstrate the State’s “profound respect for 
the life of the unborn.”184 
Justice Blackmun recognized the power of such visual images in 
influencing, even biasing, an individual’s decisions,185 and recognized 
that the influence of such images, even when accurate, might in some 
instances be inappropriate. 
In summary, to the extent women are led to make a decision they 
would otherwise not have made as a result of emotionally induced 
biases, they are unable to make the sort of autonomous decision lauded 
by the Court and mandated by Casey. To the extent that women are 
prevented from making such decisions, the information provided places 
an undue burden on their decision-making, and as such may be 
impermissible under Casey, despite that case’s approval of politicized or 
even one-sided information.186 Substantial additional research will be 
crucial in determining whether, how, and how often such undue 
influence occurs. Such research will help inform legal and policy 
discussions about the propriety, and proper form and content, of such 
informed consent statutes.187 
                                                     
184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 n.7 (internal citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun did find it 
“unobjectionable for the Commonwealth to require that the patient be informed of the nature of the 
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the 
unborn child.” Id. at 935. Providing the health risk information may not appear to be intimidating or 
imposing—after all, it is simply a factual communication. However, recall that the effectiveness of a 
fear appeal depends heavily on the degree it can instill in a listener a sense of self-relevant and 
severe threat. See supra notes 91−95. Explicitly presenting dire health risks is precisely the sort of 
approach that might produce an effective fear appeal. 
185. Cf. Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, Law in the Digital Age: How 
Visual Communication Technologies are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 
12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 227, 241−42 (2006). 
186. Recognizing such an influence on a woman’s decision-making might also give physicians a 
basis on which to refuse to provide such information, on the grounds that it would likely affect the 
woman’s “physical or mental health.” See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883−84 (noting that under the statute 
at issue there, a physician could exercise his or her medical judgment and refuse to provide the 
mandated informed consent information if “‘he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the 
information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the 
patient.’” (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). 
187. Again, further empirical research may or may not support the idea that the specific sort of 
information currently provided induces emotionally biased decision-making. Even if it does, there 
may be legal and policy reasons for not accepting such findings as dispositive. See Jeremy A. 
Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 
50−51 (2002). Nevertheless, incorporating empirical findings into the constitutional discussion can 
elicit a more informed, more transparent, richer policy discussion. Id. 
